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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the performance of regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding in multiple-input
single-output (MISO) broadcast channels with confidential messages under transmit-side channel correlation. We
derive a deterministic equivalent for the achievable per-user secrecy rate which is almost surely exact as the
number of transmit antennas and the number of users grow to infinity in a fixed ratio, and we determine the
optimal regularization parameter that maximizes the secrecy rate. Furthermore, we obtain deterministic equivalents
for the secrecy rates achievable by: (i) zero forcing precoding and (ii) single user beamforming. The accuracy
of our analysis is validated by simulations of finite-size systems.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, channel correlation, broadcast channel, random matrix theory, linear precoding.
1I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless multiuser communications are very susceptible to eavesdropping, and the transmitted in-
formation has traditionally been secured at the network layer with cryptographic schemes. However,
this raises issues like key distribution and management, and high computational complexity. Moreover,
these schemes rely on the unproven assumption that certain mathematical functions are hard to invert.
Therefore, it is of critical importance to tackle security at the physical layer.
Physical layer security was introduced in [1], [2] to exploit the randomness inherent in noisy channels.
The secrecy capacity region of a broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC), where the intended
users can act maliciously as eavesdroppers, was studied in [3], [4] among others, but only for the case
of two users. For a larger BCC with any number of malicious users, it was shown in [5], [6] that
regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding can achieve large secrecy sum-rates with low-complexity
implementation, if the channels are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). However in practice,
channel correlation is present due to local scatterers around the base station and insufficient separation
between antennas. The large-system performance of RCI precoding in the broadcast channel (BC)
without secrecy requirements under channel correlation was analyzed in [7], [8], where deterministic
approximations were obtained for the sum-rates.
In this paper, we analyze the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding in the multiple-input
single-output (MISO) BCC under transmit-side channel correlation. This work directly extends some of
the analysis in [7], [8] by requiring the transmitted messages to be kept confidential. Furthermore, this
work generalizes the results in [5], [6], where no channel correlation was assumed. In the analysis, we
provide a deterministic approximation for the large-system secrecy rates achievable by RCI precoding
under transmit-side correlation, and we derive the optimal regularization parameter of the RCI precoder
that maximizes the large-system secrecy rates. Then we obtain deterministic equivalents for the secrecy
rates achievable by: (i) zero forcing precoding and (ii) single user beamforming. Simulations demonstrate
that the analysis is accurate even when applied to finite-size systems.
2II. MISO BCC UNDER TRANSMIT-SIDE CHANNEL CORRELATION
A. System Model
We consider the downlink of a narrowband multi-user MISO system, consisting of a base station (BS)
with M antennas which simultaneously transmits K independent confidential messages to K spatially
dispersed single-antenna users. In this model, transmission takes place over a block fading channel, and
the transmitted signal is x = [x1, . . . , xM ]T ∈ CM×1. The received signal at user k is given by
yk =
M∑
j=1
hk,jxj + nk (1)
where hk,j is the channel between the j-th transmit antenna element and the k-th user, and nk is the
noise seen at the k-th receiver. The corresponding vector equation is
y = Hx+ n (2)
where H ∈ CK×M is the channel matrix with entries hk,j , y = [y1, . . . , yK ]T ∈ CK×1 and n =
[n1, . . . , nK ]
T ∈ CK×1. We assume that E[nn†] = σ2I, define the SNR ρ , 1/σ2, and impose the long-
term power constraint E[‖x‖2] = 1. The transmitted signal x is obtained at the BS by performing a linear
processing on the vector of confidential messages u = [u1, . . . , uK ]T ∈ CK×1, whose entries are chosen
independently, satisfying E[|uk|2] = 1. We assume homogeneous users, i.e. each user experiences the
same received signal power on average, thus the model assumes that their distances from the transmitter
are similar.
We consider correlation amongst transmit antenna elements, and for tractability in the analysis, we
assume a separable (or Kronecker) correlation model [8], [9]. Hence the channel matrix can be written
as
H = H˜R
1
2 (3)
where H˜ ∈ CK×M contains i.i.d. circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables, with zero
mean and unit variance, and where R ∈ CM×M is the non-singular transmit correlation matrix, given
by R = E[H†H]. We assume that each user experiences the same transmit correlation. The channel
vector for the k-th user is h†k = h˜
†
kR
1
2 ∈ CM×1.
3It is required that the BS securely transmits each message uk, ensuring that the unintended users
receive no information. We assume that for each message uk the K− 1 unintended users can cooperate
to jointly eavesdrop on the intended user k, and form an equivalent single eavesdropper with K − 1
receive antennas, denoted by k˜. Although this is impossible in practice, such worst-case assumption is
required to guarantee the secrecy of all messages, since the behavior of the users cannot be predicted.
The secrecy sum-rate is given by
Rs ,
K∑
k=1
Rk, (4)
where each secrecy rate Rk is defined as the rate at which the BS communicates reliably to user k
without allowing k˜ to obtain any information about uk.
B. Secrecy Sum-Rates with RCI Precoding
In RCI precoding, the transmitted vector is obtained as x = Wu, with the precoding matrix W ∈
CM×K given by [10]
W = [w1, · · · ,wK ] = 1√
γ
H†
(
HH† + ξMIK
)−1
u, (5)
and
γ = Tr{H†H (H†H+ ξMIM)−2} (6)
is a long-term power normalization constant. The function of the real regularization parameter ξ ≥ 0 is
to achieve a tradeoff between the signal power at the intended user and the interference and information
leakage at the unintended users for each message.
For the multi-user MISO system with malicious users, a secrecy sum-rate Rs achievable by linear
precoding was found in [5] by considering that each user k, along with its own eavesdropper k˜ and
the transmitter, forms an equivalent multi-input, single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap
channel [11]. The transmitter, the intended receiver and the eavesdropper of each MISOME wiretap
channel are equipped with M , 1 and K − 1 virtual antennas, respectively. Due to the simultaneous
transmission of the K messages, the receiver k experiences noise and interference from all the messages
uj with j 6= k. Since the malicious users can cooperate, interference cancellation can be performed at
4the receiver k˜, which does not see any undesired signal term apart from the received noise, and Rs
represents a lower-bound on the achievable secrecy sum-rate.
For a given channel H, let H
k˜
be the matrix obtained from H by eliminating the k-th row. Then a
lower-bound on the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding is [5]
Rs =
K∑
k=1
Rk =
K∑
k=1
log2
1 +
ρ|h†kwk|2
γ+ρ
∑
j 6=k |h†kwj|2
1 + ρ
γ
∥∥H
k˜
wk
∥∥2

+
. (7)
In the following, we refer to (7) as the secrecy sum-rate.
III. LARGE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the RCI precoder under transmit-side channel correlation
in the large-system regime, where both the number of receivers K and the number of transmit antennas
M approach infinity, with their ratio β = K/M being held constant and finite.
A. Large-System Secrecy Sum-Rates
The following theorem provides a deterministic equivalent for the per-user secrecy rates Rk, which
is almost surely exact as M →∞.
Theorem 1: Let ρ > 0, β > 0, and ξ > 0. Then for all k
|Rk −R◦| a.s.−→ 0, as M →∞. (8)
R◦ is the large-system secrecy rate, given by
R◦ =
log21+η
ρE22+
ξρ
β
(1+η)2E12
ρE22+(1+η)2E12
1 + ρE22
(1+η)2E12

+
, (9)
where
η = E
[
T(1 + η)
ξ(1 + η) + βT
]
, and Eij = E
[
Ti
(ξ(1 + η) + βT)j
]
. (10)
The expectations in (10) are taken over the random variable T, whose distribution function Λ(t) is the
limiting eigenvalue distribution of the correlation matrix R.
Proof: See Appendix A for a sketch of the proof.
5We note that (9) is a non-random function of ρ, β, and ξ.
Corollary 1: In the case of no channel correlation, R◦ reduces to the value obtained in [6], given by
R˜◦ =
log2
1 + g (β, ξ)
ρ+ ρξ
β
[1+g(β,ξ)]2
ρ+[1+g(β,ξ)]2
1 + ρ
[1+g(β,ξ)]2

+
, (11)
where g (β, ξ) , 1
2
[√
(1−β)2
ξ2
+ 2(1+β)
ξ
+1 + 1−β
ξ
−1
]
.
Proof: See Appendix B for a sketch of the proof.
B. Selection of the Optimal Regularization Parameter
The value of ξ affects the asymptotic secrecy rate R◦ in (9). We now study the optimal regularization
parameter ξ◦⋆ that maximizes R◦ under transmit-side channel correlation.
Theorem 2: The regularization parameter ξ◦⋆ that maximizes the secrecy rate R◦ under transmit-side
channel correlation can be obtained by solving the fixed-point equation
ξ = β
(η2 − 1)E12 − ρE22
2ρη(1 + η)E12
. (12)
Proof: See Appendix C for a sketch of the proof.
We note that η, E12, and E22 in (12) depend on ξ. It is easy to verify that the value of the regularization
parameter ξ◦⋆ that maximizes R◦ differs from the value β/ρ that maximizes the rates without secrecy
requirements [8]. Moreover in the presence of secrecy requirements, the channel correlation affects the
optimal regularization parameter.
C. Comparison with Other Precoding Schemes
1) Zero Forcing: As the regularization parameter ξ → 0, we have the zero forcing (ZF) precoder. The
aim of the ZF precoder is to cancel all the interference and information leakage. With ZF precoding
the transmitted signal is
x =

1√
γ0
H†
(
HH†
)−1
u for β ≤ 1
1√
γ0
(
H†H
)−1
H†u for β > 1
(13)
6where γ0 is the power normalization constant. It can be shown that in the large-system regime, the
secrecy rates R◦0 achievable by ZF precoding under transmit-side channel correlation are given by
R◦0 =

log2
(
1 + ρ
χ
)
for β ≤ 1{
log2
1+ ρ
ρ(β−1)+β2γ◦
0
1+ ρ(β−1)
γ◦0β
2
}+
for β > 1
(14)
with
χ =
β∫
tdΛ(t)
1+χt
and γ◦0 =
β − 1∫
dΛ(t)
t
. (15)
2) Single User Beamforming: As the regularization parameter ξ → ∞, we have the single user
beamformer (SUB). Here, the transmitter beamforms in a direction such as to maximize the signal
strenght of each user, without taking into account the interference it creates and the amount of resulting
information leakage. The SUB is given by
x =
1√
γ∞
H†u, (16)
where γ∞ is the power normalization constant. It can be shown that the secrecy rates R◦∞ achievable
by SUB in the large-system regime and under transmit-side channel correlation are
R◦∞ =
log2 1 +
ρE2[T]
β(ρE[T2]+E[T])
1 + ρE[T
2]
E[T]

+
. (17)
We note that when β ≥ 1, it is R◦∞ = 0 ∀ρ. When β < 1, there is always a value of ρ beyond
which R◦∞ = 0. Such poor performance is due to the intended user suffering from a large amount of
interference, while the eavesdroppers may cancel the interference by cooperating.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Calculating R◦ in (9) requires the limiting eigenvalue distribution of the correlation matrix R. In
this section, we consider the Toeplitz-exponential model [12], where R has a Toeplitz structure and its
entries follow the distribution rij = ν |i−j|, governed by the correlation coefficient ν ∈ [0, 1]. It can be
shown that under Toeplitz-exponential correlation, the large-system secrecy rates R◦ reduce to
R◦TE =
log21+η
ρc+ ξρ
β
(1+η)2
ρc+(1+η)2
1 + ρc
(1+η)2

+
, (18)
7with c = ξ(1+η)(1+ν
2)+β(1−ν2)
ξ(1+η)(1−ν2)+β(1+ν2) .
Fig. 1 compares the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate approximation KR◦/M under transmit-side corre-
lation to the simulated ergodic per-antenna secrecy sum-rate Rs/M with a finite number of users, for
ν = 0.5 and three values of β. The values of R◦ and Rs were obtained by (9) and (7), respectively, using
ξ = ξ◦⋆ obtained as a positive solution to (12). We note that the accuracy of the analysis decreases with
ρ. The loss of accuracy is due to the limitations of the tools used to derive the deterministic equivalents
[7]. One can increase the accuracy at any given ρ <∞ by increasing the dimension M .
Fig. 2 shows the relative secrecy rate loss (R˜◦−R◦)/R˜◦ due to channel correlation, with R◦ and R˜◦
from (9) and (11), respectively. We observe how low-to-moderate correlation , i.e. ν < 0.4, does not
affect the secrecy sum-rate excessively, i.e. the loss is less than 10 percent. However, higher correlation
can significantly degrade the performance of the RCI precoder, especially at low SNR.
Fig. 3 shows that using the large-system regularization parameter ξ◦⋆ from (12) does not cause a
significant loss in the secrecy sum-rate compared to using a finite-system regularization parameter
ξ = ξ⋆ optimized by bi-sectional search for each channel realization. The complementary cumulative
distribution function (CCDF) of the normalized secrecy sum-rate difference (Rs(ξ⋆)−Rs(ξ◦⋆))/Rs(ξ⋆)
between using ξ◦⋆ and ξ⋆ depends on the values of SNR and β, where large SNR and β = 1 represent the
worst case. The CCDFs in Fig. 3 were obtained for β = 1, and ν = 0.5. Since the average normalized
secrecy sum-rate difference is two percent or less for all values of M , the large-system regularization
parameter ξ◦⋆ from (12) may be used instead of the finite-system regularization parameter with only a
small loss of performance. Such choice avoids the computation of ξ⋆ for each channel realization.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding for the MISO broadcast
channel with confidential messages, under transmit-side channel correlation. We first analyzed the RCI
precoder in the large-system regime, and derived a deterministic equivalent for the achievable per-user
secrecy rate, as well as the optimal regularization parameter that maximizes the deterministic equivalent
of the per-user secrecy rate. Then we obtained deterministic equivalents for the secrecy rates achievable
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by: (i) zero forcing precoding and (ii) single user beamforming. The large-system approximations prove
to be accurate even for finite-size systems. Simulations showed that low-to-moderate correlation only
partially affects the secrecy rates. However, high correlation degrades the performance of the RCI
precoder, especially at low SNR.
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APPENDIX
A. Sketch of Proof of Theorem 1
By introducing the quantities [13]
Ak = h˜
†
kQkh˜k, Bk= h˜
†
kQkH˜
†
k˜
H˜
k˜
Qk˜hk, and γ = Tr
{
QkH˜R
−1
H˜†Qk
}
, (19)
with Qk =
(
H˜
†
k˜
H˜
k˜
+MξR−1
)−1
, it is possible to express the secrecy rates as
Rk =
log2 1 +
ρA2
k
ρBk+γ(1+Ak)
2
1 + ρBk
γ(1+Ak)
2

+
. (20)
As M,K →∞, the quantities in (19) respectively converge almost surely to [8]
A◦k = η, B
◦
k =
βE22
1− βE22 , and γ
◦ = − β
(1 + η)2
∂η
∂ξ
, (21)
where ∂η
∂ξ
= −(1+η)
2E12
1−βE22 and η, E12 and E22 are defined in (10). Then (9) follows from (20), (21), by
applying the continuous mapping theorem, the Markov inequality, and the Borel-Cantelli lemma [14].
B. Sketch of Proof of Corollary 1
When no channel correlation is present, we have R = I and Λ(t) = δ(t − 1), which implies η = g
and E12 = E22 = [ξ(1 + g) + β]−2. Therefore A◦k = g, B◦k =
βg
ξ(1+g)2+β
, and γ◦ = βg
ξ(1+g)2+β
, and (11)
follows.
10
C. Sketch of Proof of Theorem 2
We obtain eq. (12) by defining χ = (1+η)2E12, Z = (βE22+ξχ)(ρE22+χ), Ψ = βE22+ξ(1+η)
2E12
ρE22+(1+η)2E12
,
Φ = ρ
2ΨηΛ
βZ
, and Λ = 2η
′(1+η)E12E22+(1+η)2(E′12E22−E′22E12)
η′
[8], with E ′12E22 − E ′22E12 = −2β(1 + η +
ξη′)(E13E33 −E223), and solving
∂R◦
∂ξ
=
η′
2R◦sρχ2β(1+ ρE22
χ
)2 log 2
[Φ(ρξ−β)(χ2+ρχE22)β + ρ2Λ(β + ρηΨ)] = 0. (22)
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